As part of the Leftist vocabulary, the terminology of “cultural appropriation” is generally applied to any case involving “white” people enjoying or participating in any aspect of another culture. Of course, their narrow definition is highly focused and exclusive, constituting a political tool rather than a rational universal principle.
Their use of the term applies narrowly to the use or adoption of elements of “marginalized or minority culture by members of a dominant culture, often without permission, understanding, or proper credit.” The Canadian government's "anti-racism lexicon" describes "cultural appropriation" in this way:
"Also called cultural misappropriation, [it] is the adoption of an element or elements of one culture or identity by members of another culture or identity for use, commodification or profit, often without understanding, acknowledgement or respect for its value in the original culture. Some examples include adoption of another, usually marginalized cultures, symbols, art, language, customs, etc. Production and sale of indigenous-style crafts and artworks by non-indigenous artists and makers is an example. Cultural appropriation is most often seen when members of a dominant culture appropriate from marginalized or oppressed cultures. When cultural elements are copied from a minority culture by members of a dominant culture, these elements are used outside of their original cultural context, sometimes even against the expressly stated wishes of members of the originating culture."
As seen above, the language discriminates between "dominant" cultures and those deemed "marginalized" or "oppressed". This places some peoples and cultures in the category of "the protected class", while others are left exempt on the basis of their "dominance"; with the latter merely assumed, neither accurately quantified nor reliably proven. This resonates with the broader political agenda of the Leftists who make a habit of staking claims without evidence, proceeding from faulty definitions or stacking the deck, and making rules with either self-exemptions or benefits that come at the expense (directly or indirectly, actively or by omission) of their political enemies. As all reasonable people already understand, however, true justice comes in the form of universal principles applied consistently to each individual case, regardless of the stature or "dominance" of any given party. If the morally significant feature of "cultural appropriation" is unauthorized adoption, commercialization, extraction, decontextualization, exploitation, or disrespect for a cultural inheritance, then those features must remain morally relevant regardless of which culture is said to occupy the "dominant" position. What's more, it comes as no surprise that the definition is specifically crafted to exclude the groups most commonly affected by real “cultural appropriation”: the “white” people of Western civilization who, in being uniquely tolerant and welcoming of multiculturalism, have seen waves of immigrants and refugees wash upon their shores, using the land, language, freedoms, currency, and technology with little regard for their cultural significance.
Where those migrants wash upon new shores and leverage those advantages, they regularly do so without any “permission, understanding, or proper credit” so far as the native population is concerned, but they are effectively exempt for a few particular reasons: the common definitions as stated, the victimhood narrative, the dominant political forces at play, and the fact that most people simply want to keep to themselves and avoid the intractable morass of modern politics. Of course, I would be remiss not to scrutinize the idea that “white” people could even theoretically be eligible to “appropriate” elements of any so-called “marginalized” group, as sufficient “understanding” necessarily means accepting the notion, as promulgated politically, that “white” people are evil incarnate, unworthy of the cultures which they have been gracious enough to welcome upon their shores. Of course, these political actors relish the idea that they are in charge and that the need for “permission” extends to all things — not just to the tangibles and intangibles which they claim as their own but to that which their enemies wish to do, think, or say in any meaningful capacity.
If “cultural appropriation” is stripped of its political dressing, it is better understood as the use or adoption of some aspect of another’s culture — other than one’s own — for some advantage. And, if that principle is to have any coherence, it cannot be selectively applied according to which culture is being appropriated. For the purposes of coherence and consistency, the same principle must be extended for the protection of the languages, customs, expedients, technologies, and institutions of every culture, including Western cultures. Of course, the only reason that the terminology of “cultural appropriation” even exists is not as a universal principle to be taken seriously but as a rule for punishing or manipulating political enemies of the Left.
Language is particularly important in this regard. It is not merely a neutral mechanism for transmitting information. A language conveys, preserves, and connects its speakers with culture and heritage. Its vocabulary, idioms, humor, conventions, modes of expression, and patterns of thought embody the accumulated experience of the people who have inherited it. To appropriate a language, therefore, is not simply to acquire a convenient communications tool. It is to adopt something that carries the cultural inheritance of another people.
Yet the appropriation of Western languages, expedients, and technologies has generally been treated as though it is somehow categorically different. English, in particular, has been transformed into an international instrument of education, commerce, professional advancement, immigration, and economic opportunity. Its adoption is incentivized among people with native languages other than English, for the fact that English provides access to those advantages.
There is nothing inherently objectionable about learning another language or adopting useful technology; in fact, that mutual understanding can and often does bridge gaps between peoples, and it often enables different peoples across the globe to work together to efficiently share information and coordinate resources. The problem arises when the object being adopted is treated merely as a tool, casually stripped of the cultural meaning and inheritance with which it is connected, and then altered or reconstituted according to the ends and purposes of those who have adopted it.
This is especially apparent in the contemporary treatment of English.
English can be learned and treated as a cultural inheritance, or it can be learned and treated as a mere tool or expedient, recited (as some do) as lines of code devoid of humanity or personality.
The distinction matters.
A person who learns English because he seeks to honor or participate in the culture associated with it may develop an appreciation not merely for its utility but for the richness of its heritage: that which it has birthed in literature, humor, conventions, history, and particular modes of living and human expression. For this reason, a true appreciation of language is inseparable from the study of the native peoples and cultures that developed, defended, and sustained it.
But English can also be treated as a form of technology or economic necessity: a tool or credential to obtain employment, a mechanism for entering professional institutions, a means for accessing markets, or a necessity for advancement.
When a language is treated exclusively in this instrumental fashion, it can be degraded by the very process by which it is made to spread. Its words remain. Its grammar remains. Its vocabulary may even expand. But the cultural and human qualities that distinguish a living language from a communications protocol may wane as a consequence.
The resulting speech may be technically proficient while sounding strangely mechanical: highly structured, formulaic, procedural, and devoid of the color, vigor, or personality which makes a living language; and these effects are exacerbated (and even spread) with the rise of legalese, political doublespeak, bureaucratic red tape, corporate jargon, and even the advent of certain artificial intelligence tools as they gain in popularity. Conversation consequently becomes an exercise in transmitting information rather than a meeting of minds between human beings. And, to the extent that artificial intelligence technologies democratize information, conversation progressively becomes a mode of transmitting the information both as framed and as prioritized by the sources democratizing it. It is in this way that people eventually come to read from a similar or identical index card of allowable opinion, whereby their language becomes not only more lifeless but also more uninteresting in the course of securing the people's conformity, whose lives themselves come to resemble the lifeless, procedural, and performative qualities of the language they are permitted to speak.
This is not simply a matter of accent or pronunciation. It concerns the treatment of language itself.
A language is not a programming interface.
It is not a standardized communications protocol.
It is a cultural inheritance.
If it is wrong to appropriate the cultural objects of one people, alter them, commercialize them, detach them from their origins, or use them merely as expedients for personal advantage, then the same principle must apply when the culture being appropriated belongs to the West.
There is no principled basis for saying that cultural appropriation is objectionable when directed toward one culture but perfectly acceptable when directed toward another.
Nor does the principle stop at language.
Western technologies, institutions, educational systems, intellectual traditions, social conventions, and other cultural expedients may likewise be adopted for advantage. The fact that they are useful does not make them culturally meaningless. Their usefulness does not erase their origins.
The issue is not whether people may ever learn from, borrow from, or participate in another culture. Civilization has always developed through exchange. The issue is whether one set of standards is being applied selectively: whether some peoples are entitled to regard their cultural objects as proprietary possessions deserving respect and protection while the cultural objects of Western peoples are treated as universally-available resources that may be adopted, altered, and reconstituted without any corresponding concern for their integrity.
If cultural appropriation is a legitimate concept, its principle must be universal.
There is another consequence that deserves more attention. When people adopt a language solely or principally because it provides economic advantage, they may treat not only the language but also the society associated with it as an instrument; metaphorically speaking, it is akin to the tragedy of the commons (a documented political and economic phenomenon accompanying the abuse of public resources), leaving the cultural object in question (like so many public spaces and roadways) in a condition better resembling a neglected football locker room in desperate need of attention rather than a museum or library with contents to be cherished. Where the language and the culture are treated as tools or resources, as incidental to desired ends, that is precisely where we have the tragedy of the commons in language and culture, where there is precious little pride and even less incentive to defend or care about the deeper meanings and legacies. So, while in the conventional "tragedy of the commons" the resources are exhausted or used up by those with little vested interest in maintaining them, with the costs borne collectively, it is in the metaphorical sense that we see a similar tragedy unfold with a language and culture abused and overlooked in its richness, with extensive use and extraction of benefits occurring without corresponding cultural stewardship.
It is in this way that the language becomes a means of obtaining employment, education, wealth, immigration, professional status, or access to institutions, often public services sustained by exploiting the very people whose culture, language, and society are suffering the abuse. And, of course, society as a whole is generally symptomatic of the common language, serving both as the lens by which to view things and as the driver of dominant descriptions and conceptualizations, setting the table for not just the content but the form of discussion which is permitted or prioritized. Over time, society comes to express the environment through which those advantages are obtained and by which beliefs are shaped, where we (as today) see the language turned against the people who speak it as their native tongue.
This can produce a mentality in which that which is useful is eagerly adopted while that which is culturally particular is ignored or discarded.
In this case, the language is desired for its utility but not necessarily its heritage, and so far as this comes to dominate social expression, this becomes the new identity of the language and the prevailing description of society itself. The institutions are desired for their benefits but not necessarily their underlying traditions. The freedoms are desired for the opportunities they provide but not necessarily the histories that bequeathed them or the responsibilities that sustain them. The society is desired for what it can provide, rather than embraced as a cultural inheritance to which one has obligations as well as rights.
In this sense, the instrumentalization of a language can become part of a broader instrumentalization of the society in which that language developed.
This should not be understood as a claim about the character or motives of every immigrant or non-native speaker. The argument is as descriptive as it is prescriptive: it is concerned not merely with what individuals ought to do, but with the effects that arise when instrumental treatment of a cultural inheritance becomes a prevailing social trend. In the case of language, the concern is not that using a language for its practical utility is inherently wrong, but that its treatment primarily as a tool may diminish the richness, depth, and cultural character that distinguish a living language from a mere communications protocol. It is a criticism of the selective framing of that which is termed "cultural appropriation", and it is a criticism of the mode of cultural participation as described throughout this article: taking what is useful from another culture while treating the culture itself as incidental or unworthy.
It is worth noting that every culture changes. No language has ever remained perfectly static, and no cultural inheritance can be preserved unchanged forever, but acknowledging inevitable change is not the same as declaring that all change is equally benign.
If a cultural object can be altered, compromised, reformed, reconstituted, corrupted, or misused through appropriation, then language must be included among the objects to which that rule applies.
The fact that English has become an international language does not make it culturally empty. Nor does the global indispensability of Western technologies mean that their cultural origins have ceased to matter.
Indeed, the more successful a cultural object becomes internationally, the easier it may become to forget that it came from somewhere — that it was created, developed, refined, defended, and transmitted by particular peoples and societies with unique values and traditions.
The universalization of a cultural object (as in the case of the English language) can, therefore, paradoxically conceal, distort, or separate from its identity over time.
The appropriate principle is not necessarily cultural isolation. It is, at minimum, reciprocity, ideological consistency, and respect for the customs and cultures that have birthed the tools and societies which have proved useful or hospitable.
If people are entitled to demand respect for the integrity of their language, traditions, cultural objects, and heritage, then all peoples are entitled to the same consideration.
If it is legitimate to criticize outsiders for appropriating and transforming the cultural objects of one people, then it must also be legitimate to criticize the appropriation and transformation of Western cultural objects, among them the language native to the people who developed, refined, and defended it.
If it is desirable to learn another culture's language, then it behooves the learner to respect the language as a cultural inheritance rather than simply a useful tool.
And if a person enters another society because that society offers economic opportunity, education, freedom, hospitality, or prosperity, there is a corresponding question of whether that society is being treated as a community and an inheritance or merely as an instrument. There is, likewise, the question of whether the person entering that new society inherits the obligation to assimilate and to thereby respect the culture which has been so welcoming. This author submits accordingly that these are the minimum obligations of any such person.
The central issue, then, is not whether cultures may influence one another. They inevitably will. It is whether the given cultural exchange is reciprocal, respectful, and conscious of what is being exchanged, or whether one culture's inheritance is simply converted into another person's expedient.
A language is not merely a tool.
Culture is not merely a resource.
And society is not merely an opportunity, nor a mere "sum of interrelations," as Karl Marx so blandly put it.
As for the concept of "cultural appropriation", it was clearly born of political intentions. However, to the extent that we are to treat it as a worthwhile principle, to the extent that the proposition is applied or held as righteous when discussing the protection of one culture's heritage, then it cannot logically cease to apply when the language, culture, and heritage in question happen to be of Western character. Such a rule otherwise ceases to operate as a principle to instead function as a weapon, wielded selectively against enemies unprotected and (so far as the political bodies influence law enforcement, control the popular narratives, and determine the accepted definitions) unpermitted to defend themselves.
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